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Domestic levela b s t r a c t
The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound economic and social impacts on the world. It has
highlighted an urgent need to strengthen existing international biosecurity governance mechanisms to
prevent the misuse and malicious abuse of life science research and maintain international biological
arms control norms. Biologists are at the front line of biotechnology development and are key to main-
taining biosecurity awareness and moral self-discipline. As an important first step, biologists need to
actively participate in the formulation and implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures
to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability. Furthermore, efforts should be made to advocate for and
promote the establishment of an ethical code of conduct for biologists to share safety responsibilities for
global biosecurity. To maximize the impact of this ethical code of conduct, an effective approach to imple-
menting codes of conduct for biologists at both national and international levels should be established
under the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co., Ltd. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Contents1. Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2. Statement of problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3. Code of conduct for life science research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4. The BTWC advances the formulation of a code of conduct for biologists. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5. Why should an ethical code of conduct for biologists be formulated and implemented under the framework of the BTWC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6. Responsible life science research and respective responsibilities under the code of conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7. Building a Multi-level system of ethical code for biologists under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of the United Nations with
effective implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
8. Effective approaches of development and implementation of code of conduct at an international level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9. Effective approaches of development and implementation of code of conduct at a domestic level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
10. Effective approaches of development and implementation of code of conduct at a national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
11. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Conflict of interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Y. Xue, L. Shang and W. Zhang Journal of Biosafety and Biosecurity 3 (2021) 108–1191. Background
Recently, significant progress has been made in developing
cutting-edge biotechnology, such as gene-editing technology, pro-
tein engineering, and synthetic biology. Although biotechnology
development has highly benefited society, countries all over the
world are also facing risks arising from the potential misuse and
abuse of these technologies. Furthermore, as biotechnology has
become increasingly accessible, the threshold for biological
weapon production has significantly decreased, thereby increasing
the risk of accidental and deliberate use of the knowledge and
materials to harm humans, animals, plants, or the environment.
Thus, extensive discussions have been conducted among the inter-
national community on balancing the two major themes of
biotechnology, development and security, and coordinating these
themes to deal with the challenge of the coexistence of hope and
danger.
While striving to improve their regulatory biosecurity systems,
governments of each country also require a platform for collective
action. Unknown risks related to biotechnology and biosecurity often
lead to an inevitable lag in legal consequences and effective penalties.
Moreover, as many uncertainties still exist in the current develop-
ment and application of biotechnology, its safety can only be specu-
latively assessed based on unknown possible risks, which presents a
further challenge for legal enforcement. In fact, technologies that
have been fully discussed and assessed for risks within the scientific
community could present unknown threats and risks to humanity.
Therefore, legal disputes cannot be effectively enforced because there
is a lack of necessary judicial determination of causality, resulting in
‘‘red line” breaches. For example, at the Meeting of Experts for the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in August 2015,
Swiss scientist Dr. Cedric Invernizzi presented a report entitled
‘‘CRISPR/CAS: An Adaptive Bacterial Immune System is Becoming a Game
Changer in Genetic Engineering,”. This raised concerns on the potential
risks of CRISPR-Cas 9 gene editing technology as it potentially had
‘‘. . .irreversible and unpredictable risks with unknown consequences
for other species.”1 These concerns were confirmed only a few years
later when the world’s first genetically edited baby was completed
by a Chinese researcher, Mr. He Jiankui, in 2018, which sparked an
intensive international debate on the safety and ethics of biological
research.2
Current risks of biosecurity are primarily related to human mis-
use and abuse and stem from the out-of-control behavior of rele-
vant subjects under the comprehensive action of internal and
external environments. Thus, the autonomy of the relevant stake-
holders is an important feature present in biological sciences, that
is absent from other field, such as that of nuclear technology.3 Biol-
ogists are the first line of defense against the misuse of biotechnol-
ogy; therefore, their biosecurity awareness and moral self-
discipline is key to prevention. For future safety, it is the responsi-
bility of biologists to be proactive in terms of the development and
application of biotechnology, while pursuing bold research and
prudently promoting biological sciences. Researchers should effec-
tively reduce the potential risks arising from the knowledge, tools,
and technologies required to conduct such research and ensure
that it is only used for peaceful and sustainable development.
Accordingly, increasing efforts should be made to advocate for
and promote the establishment of a code of conduct for biologists
to share safety responsibilities for global biosecurity. This will cul-
tivate a sense of professional responsibility and historical mission
among practitioners, encourage the role of the scientific commu-
nity in self-disciplining, and promote the orderly participation of
multiple parties in the process of biosecurity governance. This will
ultimately prevent biological risks, while obtaining full benefits of
biotechnology.1092. Statement of problem
During the meeting of experts at the BTWC in 2005, representa-
tives from 23 scientific organizations, research institutions, and
companies around the world participated in an informal exchange
at an open session on ‘‘Discussing and Promoting Consensus and
Effective Action on the Content, Promulgation, and Adoption of a
Code of Conduct for Scientists,” which represented a broader con-
sensus among biologists and international scientific organizations
to establish a self-discipling code against biosecurity risks. In
2009, the National Academies of Sciences of the U.S. also stated
that ‘‘individual awareness is important, as is education and train-
ing, to create and maintain a culture of trust and responsibility that
is central to sustaining good scientific conduct.”4 In the same year,
the Global Partnership Working Group issued a recommendation
for a ‘‘Coordinated Approach in the Field of Global Knowledge Prolifer-
ation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Encouraging Scientists Par-
ticipation,” noting that ‘‘closer attention now needs to be paid to
engage scientists and raise their awareness and sense of responsi-
bility to prevent the diversion of their knowledge in legitimate sci-
entific disciplines for unintended malicious purposes, strengthen
the framework to prevent the dissemination of sensitive informa-
tion, promote cooperation, and advance common non-
proliferation goals.”5 However, current codes of conduct in life
sciences are difficult to implement because there is little empirical
evidence to link themwith positive changes in scientists’ behaviors
suggesting their effectiveness may be limited.6 After investigating
the Code of Conduct for Dutch Scientists, some researchers argued
that ‘‘the rapidly evolving codes and guidelines may deceptively
simplify moral awareness to a matter of compliance rather than
see it as a constituent element of professionalism, character, and
responsibility.”7
In 2011, the National Scientific Advisory Board on Biosafety
(NSABB) of the U.S. released a report following a 6 y study. The
report entitled ‘‘Strengthening Responsible Science: Considerations
for the Formulation and Dissemination of a Code of Conduct for
Dual-use Research” pointed out three key elements to ensure the
effectiveness of a code of conduct: guarantees of strong institutions
and resources, firm commitment to and active dissemination of the
code, and the full demonstration of the code through discussion.8
Similarly, the Federal Expert Security Advisory Group (FESAP) of
the U.S. made recommendations for ‘‘Strengthening emphasis on
biosafety, laboratory biosafety, and responsible behavior culture in life
sciences” in 2015.9 To ensure the acceptability and effectiveness of
these codes of conduct, organizational culture related to biological
risk governance, responsible scientific research, compliance with
relevant laws, regulations, guidelines, and policies, and emphasiz-
ing the values and beliefs of life science research practitioners is
necessary at all institutions. The concept of a biosafety and biose-
curity culture (as a subset of organizational culture) is multilay-
ered and complex,10 and must be imbibed by all stakeholders in
any organization. Therefore, collective self-governance mecha-
nisms need to be widely implemented.
In 2018, the Chinese government and the Implementation Sup-
port Unit (ISU) of the BTWC jointly organized an international
workshop in Tianjin China on ‘‘Building a Global Biosafety Commu-
nity with a Shared Future: Developing a Code of Conduct for Biol-
ogists.” Approximately 100 representatives from over 20 countries,
including the US, Russia, Britain, Germany, India, Pakistan, Brazil,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland, attended meetings, as well as
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the
World Organization of Animal Health (OIE) and other relevant
international organizations, 10 universities and research institu-
tions, including the National Academy of Sciences, Johns Hopkins,
Stanford, Oxford, and Bradford University, attended the meeting.
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ciples, target groups, effective implementation, and sustainable
development of an Ethical Code of Conduct for Biologists formu-
lated under the framework of the BTWC, but no unified consensus
was reached.
Therefore, in this paper we intend to discuss the following main
issues:
i) Past Codes of conduct that have been developed in life
science research.
ii) The BTWC’s advancement of the formulation of a code of
conduct for biologists.
iii) The stakeholders currently involved in responsible life
science research and their responsibilities under the code
of conduct.
iv) Building a multi-level system of ethical code for biologists
under the BTWC with an effective implementation strategy.
The active participation of biologists in the formulation and
implementation of relevant biosecurity policies and measures is
key to effective and sustainable biosecurity governance.11 Here,
we review the development of codes of conduct in life science
research and present the necessity for formulating a code of con-
duct for biologists under the framework of the BTWC.We then pro-
pose an approach to implement codes of conduct for biologists at
both national and international levels under the framework of
the BTWC, with the aim of ensuring more effective
implementation.3. Code of conduct for life science research
A code of conduct is a formal and systematic set of rules,
responsibilities, norms, and expectations of appropriate behav-
ior.10 In life sciences, codes of conduct raise awareness on dual-
use issues and social responsibility, promote best practices, and
reinforce the norm against the use of biological agents for bioter-
rorism or biowarfare.12 The earliest concept of these codes of con-
duct can be traced back to the Hippocratic Oath from the 5th-3rd
century BCE. As the foundation of ancient Greek professional
ethics, the Hippocratic Oath is a professional ethics framework
for the medical profession, with four key principles: gratitude
towards the teachers; prescription of regimens for the good of
patients according to one’s ability and judgment; refrain from
harm and abusing professional convenience to do unethical or ille-
gal things; and– respecting and protecting personal privacy and
business secrets. The earliest modern medical ethics code is the
Code of Conduct for Hospitals and Medical Staff, drafted by the British
medical ethicist Thomas Percival for Manchester Hospital in 1794.
One of the key components of the codes was the introduction of
the relationship between medical staff and hospital funding, in
addition to the doctor-patient relationship included in early med-
ical ethics. In 1847, based on this code, the American Medical Asso-
ciation (AMA) formulated medical ethics education standards and
codes, which included the responsibilities of doctors to patients,
obligations of patients to doctors, doctors’ responsibilities to other
doctors and their peers, responsibilities of the medical profession
to the public, and obligations of the public to the profession.
Since the 20th century, the rapid progression of medicine has
increased the moral responsibilities of medical professionals, and
increasing international collaboration and medical practices across
countries has highlighted the need to formulate unified interna-
tional, medical, ethical norms for medical staff. In 1946, the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg created the well-known
Nuremberg Code, which formulated the basic principles for human
experimentation: ‘‘the experiment should be such as to yield fruit-110ful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods
or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.”
The Nuremberg Code laid the foundation for research on human
and animal subjects in life science research. In 1949, the World
Medical Association (WMA) passed the International Code of Medi-
cal Ethics of WMA in London, which further clarified the contents of
three items: a general code for doctors, the duties of doctors to
patients, and of doctors to other doctors. The Tuskegee syphilis
experiment scandal of the U.S. Department of Public Health
(PHS) secretly studying the effects of syphilis on the human body
using 400 African American black men as test objects since 1932,
accelerated the development of biomedical ethics. In 2000, the
European Science Foundation issued the landmark science policy
document, Good Scientific Practice in Research and Academics,
proposing that scientific institutions worldwide should establish
domestic scientific research codes for scientists. In 2003, the All
European Academies, a joint European organization composed of
53 national scientific and humanities institutions, created the
Memorandum of Scientific Integrity (2003). Based on this, the
European Science Foundation and the All European Academies
issued the European Code of Conduct of Research Integrity as a
consensus document in 2010, which was further supported by 31
other research foundations from 22 countries at the Second World
Conference on Research Integrity. This code stipulated a formal
code of conduct and practical principles for systematic research
in natural sciences, including medicine, life sciences, humanities,
and social sciences.
To date, codes of conduct (including ethical codes) in life
science research have mainly been formulated by academic organi-
zations or professional associations at the national (regional) and
international level. According to research by Burnette and Connell,
‘‘establishing and attaching importance to a culture of ethical and
safe behavior, and implementing effective biological risk manage-
ment seem like possible ways to prevent the abuse of biological
materials and significantly improve control of potential risks in
the life science research community at the national level.”13 Since
2005, with increased attention on biosecurity from governments
around the world, more organizations have been engaged in build-
ing and promoting codes of conduct in life science research. For
example, the Royal Society of the UK, the Wellcome Trust, and Bri-
tish Medical Association (BMA) released two reports in the same
year: Do No Harm: Reducing the Potential for the Misuse of Life
Science Research,14 and Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity
II,15 in which the importance of codes of conduct was discussed.
In 2005, the AMA published the Code of Medical Ethics: Guidelines
to Prevent Malevolent Use of Biomedical Research.16 The Dutch gov-
ernment entrusted the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences with formulating the Netherlands Code of Conduct of
Biosecurity in 2006, which covered awareness raising, research
and publication policies, accountability and supervision, internal
and external communication, accessibility, and shipping and trans-
portation for life sciences researchers.17 In 2008, the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) also formulated a code of conduct
titled the ‘‘Use of Highly Pathogenic Microorganisms and Viruses for
Germany”, which was further updated in 2013.18 The American
Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (ASBMB) and
American Society for Microbiology (ASM) formulated codes of con-
duct for their members, prohibiting the abuse of sciences in the
process of exploring biochemistry, molecular biology, and microbi-
ology.16 In 2015, the Indonesian Academy of Sciences formulated
its domestic code of conduct on biosecurity with the help of the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.19 Recently, with
the assistance of the German government, the Tunisian govern-
ment formulated a code of conduct for its domestic biological
science research in 2019.20 In 2020, the National Academy of Med-
icine, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Royal Society
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ing (HHGE)”, which recognized that the International Commission
on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing and was
specifically tasked with defining a responsible pathway for clinical
use of HHGE, should a decision be made by any nation to permit its
use.21
At the international level, the International Committee of the
Red Cross issued a document entitled ‘‘Preventing the Abuse of Life
Sciences: From Ethics and Law to Best Practice” in 2004.22 In the
same year, members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Region (APEC)
discussed the introduction of the same code of conduct for scien-
tists.23 In 2005, the InterAcademy partnership (IAP) panel formu-
lated the Statement on Biosecurity, which proposed awareness,
safety and security, education, information, accountability, and
supervision principles on the basis of scientists’ autonomy of
responsible research.24 In the same year, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued the Interna-
tional Future Plan for Promoting Responsible Management in Life
Science,25 and took the European Code of Conduct on Biosecurity as
a specific initiative of the organization, aiming to revise and sup-
plement laws and regulations to prevent scientific abuse and raise
awareness of biologists’ responsibilities in Europe.26 In 2006, the
International Union of Microbiological Societies adopted the Code
of Ethics against Misuse of Scientific Knowledge, Research Results
and Resources.27 In the same year, the World Medical Association
(WMA) updated the WMA International Code of Medical Ethics
in South Africa. In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) for-
mulated the guiding document Responsible Life Sciences Research for
Global Health and Safety. In 2019, the World Organization of Animal
Health (OIE) issued the Guide to Responsible Behavior in Veterinary
Research, formulating a governance framework model to mitigate
biosecurity risks, which emphasized interaction among multiple
stakeholders in the field, and the importance of raising awareness
of biosecurity risks.28 In addition, organizations representing ama-
teur scientists, such as DIY Bio, formulated codes of conduct to reg-
ulate their own members in 2011.11
In addition, the biotechnology industry has started to introduce
self-regulation models centered on products and services. For
example, based on the understanding that reducing the safety risks
of gene synthesis technology is in line with their long-term eco-
nomic interests, the two major international industry associations
of commercial gene synthesis, the International Association of Syn-
thetic Biology and the International Gene Synthesis Consortium,
provided guides and necessary software for their members to
screen new customers and DNA synthesis orders, and promised
to only purchase synthetic genes from companies that abided by
the code of conduct, so as to strengthen self-regulation,29 and pre-
vent the abuse of synthetic biology technology to construct dan-
gerous viruses or bacterial pathogens from scratch.
Although many countries and international professional organi-
zations have formulated codes of conduct, they vary greatly in
terms of breadth, depth, and purpose.30 The general state of cur-
rent codes of conduct for life science research have the following
characteristics:
i) To date, no unified code of conduct applicable to all biolo-
gists or for interdisciplinary sciences has been created. This
has created challenges in integrating various normative
resources and improving the effectiveness of the code of
conduct for life science research across a wide spectrum of
research fields.
ii) Different levels of attention to biosecurity or prevention of
biotechnology abuse are observed in the content and struc-
ture of the codes.111iii) Three different types of codes co-exist and complicate fur-
ther implementation: ideal codes (codes of ethics) that
mainly stipulate the scientific beliefs that practitioners
should adhere to for biological research, such as standards
of integrity, honesty or objectivity; educational (advisory)
codes that add to ideal codes by guiding research through
guidelines and suggestions; and executable codes that indi-
cate acceptable research behavior, and are often connected
with the legal system to ensure effective implementation.31
4. The BTWC advances the formulation of a code of conduct for
biologists
In October 2001, the United Nations (UN) and its Anti-terrorism
Policy Working Group recommended that the BTWC should
develop a code of conduct for biologists. As the first international
weapons control standard to completely ban biological weapons
systems, and the only multilateral agreement adopted by the Uni-
ted Nations General Assembly in the field of international biosecu-
rity governance, the BTWC has continued to promote a code of
conduct for biologists as a binding resolution adopted by all state
parties for nearly 20 y. During the 5th Review Conference of the
State Parties to the BTWC in 2002, a consensus was reached follow-
ing an intersessional work program to discuss and promote com-
mon understanding and effective action by the state parties on
topics including ‘‘the content, promulgation and application of a
code of conduct for scientists.”32 In 2004, the State Parties to the
BTWC first introduced the topic ‘‘Code of Conduct for Scientists on
the Safe and Ethical Use of Biological Sciences.” During the BTWC
Experts Meeting in 2005, one of the themes was formally estab-
lished to ‘‘discuss and promote consensus and effective action on
the content, promulgation, and adoption of a code of conduct for
scientists,” to which the German government submitted a working
document entitled ‘‘Code of Conduct in Life Sciences and Its Appli-
cation in Universities,” (working paper no. 12). It proposed that a
code of conduct ‘‘should include an important element: the obliga-
tion to understand possible dual uses of biomedicine and bio-
science research.‘‘ Since then, the BTWC has directed more
attention to discussing the establishment and implementation of
codes of conduct. In the final document of the 6th Review Confer-
ence of the State Parties to the BTWC in 2006, the state parties
reached a consensus on ‘‘recognizing the importance of a code of
conduct and self-regulatory mechanisms to raise biosecurity
awareness among relevant practitioners and called upon the State
Parties to seek to prevent misuse of bioscience and biotechnology
research that may be used for purposes prohibited by the BTWC
through the development of a code of conduct.”33 Then in 2008,
a special topic was established and dedicated to ”supervision, edu-
cation, raising awareness, and adopting and/or developing a code
of conduct to prevent potential misuse prohibited by the BTWC
in the context of advances in bioscience and biotechnology
research‘‘ during the Meeting of State Parties to the BTWC.34 The
Experts Meeting at the BTWC in 2012 established ”Voluntary Codes
of Conduct and Other Measures to Encourage Responsible Conduct
by Scientists, Academia, and Industry‘‘ as one of the important
topics.35 During the 2015 Meeting of the State Parties to the BTWC,
the Chinese government submitted a working paper on the devel-
opment of a model code of conduct for biologists under the BTWC.
Subsequently, the working document ”Code of Conduct for Biologists
(Model)‘‘ was formally submitted to the 8th Review Conference of
the State Parties to the BTWC in 2016, jointly by the Chinese and
Pakistan governments as working paper no. 30 of the BTWC. Nota-
bly, in this meeting, the state parties reached an important consen-
sus to ‘‘encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility
among relevant national professionals and the voluntary develop-
ment, adoption, and promulgation of codes of conduct.”36
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work program of the 9th Review Conference of the BTWC. The
actions included:
i) recommendations during the Annual Meeting of State Par-
ties to the BTWC in 2017 to strengthen the scientific and
technical review process of the BTWC, such as establishing
a designated review body and a formulation of a code of con-
duct for biologists.37 In the meeting, the Center for Biosafety
Research and Strategy at Tianjin University, a non-
government organization (NGO) involved in the drafting of
the ‘‘Code of Conduct for Biologists (Model)” submitted by
the Chinese and Pakistan governments, issued a call for the
promotion of a code of conduct under the framework of
the BTWC.
ii) The Chinese government and the Implementation Support
Unit (ISU) of the BTWC and the Center for Biosafety Research
and Strategy at Tianjin University jointly organized an inter-
national workshop on ‘‘Building a Global Biosafety Community
with a Shared Future: Developing a Code of Conduct for Biolo-
gists” in Tianjin, China in June 2018.
iii) Finally, a full-floor discussion themed ‘‘Voluntary Codes of
Conduct” was held during the 2018 Annual Meeting of
Experts on Developments in the Field of Science and Tech-
nology Related to the BTWC (MX2) in August. A side meeting
on ‘‘Developing a Code of Conduct for Biologists” was also pre-
sented by a group of scientists and policy researchers from
China, the United Kingdom, and Netherlands. Recently,
experts from the Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy
at Tianjin University shared their thoughts on the urgency,
significance, and implementation of codes of conduct at
the 2020 and 2021 Annual Meeting of Experts on Develop-
ments in the Field of Science and Technology Related to
the BTWC (MX2).
The recent global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemics further
demonstrated that global biological security threats are primarily
due to the rapid economic and social development of many coun-
tries as well as increasing globalization. Therefore, strengthening
international codes against any possible malicious use of science
and technology is urgently required.38 With the rapid development
of bioscience and biotechnology, as well as challenges, such as
unstable global security, the adoption of a ‘‘Code of Conduct for
Biologists” as a resolution at the upcoming 9th Review Conference
of the State Parties to the BTWC in 2022 becomes increasingly
important for the world to strengthen international biosecurity
consensus and achieve substantive international cooperation.5. Why should an ethical code of conduct for biologists be
formulated and implemented under the framework of the
BTWC?
Biosecurity risks caused by biotechnology misuse and abuse are
often complex, superimposed, and intertwined with diverse mili-
tary, economic, and social security threats and the hidden dangers
contained within them are not fully understood. Additionally, con-
flicts between the accumulation of biotechnology and the legal sys-
tem inevitably arise, thereby increasing supervision challenges. It
has previously been pointed out that ‘‘laws and norms complement
each other. Implementing norms through formal laws and regula-
tions is a slow and arduous task, which often meets considerable
resistance. It is therefore difficult to complete this work by enforc-
ing laws.”39 Thus, effective supervision of biosecurity risks arising
from life science research may require a combination of ‘‘hard”
and ‘‘soft” laws. Briefly, hard law refers mainly to conventions,112laws, and regulations, while soft law refers to voluntary norms
and codes. Governance tools such as codes of conduct, moral stan-
dards, and education are soft laws and informal measures, whose
implementation focus on self-management by relevant institutions
and personnel.11 Countries throughout the world are going
through a process of trial and error to deal with biosecurity threats,
which requires soft laws to oversee researchers on the frontiers of
biotechnology and improve the efficiency of biosecurity gover-
nance through easily adjustable and controllable mechanisms
before other national biosecurity governance rules can be issued.
Advantageously, the formulation of soft law involves fewer restric-
tions on people as well as less time and space requirements than
hard laws, and more active participation and joint consultation,
which may compensate for the insufficiency of traditional hard
laws for fairer and more just biosecurity governance, better
strengthening human rationality to restrain the abuse of technical
capabilities and illegal acquisition of economic benefits, and pro-
tecting public safety while ensuring progress in scientific and tech-
nological research and industry innovation in accordance with
laws and regulations.
The self-management model of the code of conduct proposed by
the gene synthesis industry provides a useful template for biosecu-
rity governance. However, this model, based on market interests, is
not necessarily applicable to academia or many scientists and
researchers working for governments where cultivating and estab-
lishing a responsible culture through moral education may be
more valuable and practical.40 Practical experience showed that
one common issue of codes of conduct in life science research,
whether at the national (regional) or international level, was that
it was often difficult to guarantee effective implementation
because the code is voluntary and lacks a strict implementation
mechanism. In many cases, biosecurity threats caused by biotech-
nology development have global consequences. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to take a consistent and comprehensive approach to
formulate ethical decisions related to biotechnology safety risks
and social responsibilities due to the diverse cultural, social, reli-
gious, and economic backgrounds of different countries, particu-
larly at the international level.41 The Hague Code of Ethics, which
is an international model to regulate the behavior of chemical
researchers, has benefited from its formulation and implementa-
tion in accordance with the principles of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, so that it can be endorsed as a responsible scientific
research principle in chemistry. Similar to chemistry, although
codes of conduct for biologists are aimed at individual scientists,
most biologists still serve in traditional scientific research institu-
tions such as universities and governments, with the exception of
a few amateur DIY Bio scientists,. Even when research funds are
from private sources, the influence of the government on domestic
enterprises cannot be ignored. When signing the BTWC in 1969,
President Nixon stated ‘‘Scientists across the world, regardless of
language, race or background, belong to a common society. They
are not developing biological weapons that one country may use
against another, but are now fully committed to fighting the
enemy of all mankind – disease.”42 From Nixon’s statement, biolo-
gists seemed set free by the BTWC.43 However, judging from the
process of vaccine development undertaken by countries around
the world in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, espe-
cially the plan approved by the UK Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy to deliberately infect participants with
COVID-19 to better understand the virus,44 the research behavior
of individual scientists is still influenced by the policies of their
countries and institutions.
It is worth noting that self-management cannot be completed
solely by individual behavior, and it relies on bodies or platforms
with execution authority. Surveys show that many life science
researchers still lack awareness of the misuse and abuse risks asso-
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require a systematically organized ‘‘prevention network” that inte-
grates stakeholder demands into a coherent policy and regulatory
framework to prevent unintentional or deliberate release of biolog-
ical agents and toxins.16 Since its establishment in 1974, the BTWC
has gradually formed a prevention network universally recognized
by all state parties to eliminate the threat of biological weapons,
prevent their spread, and promote the peaceful use of biotechnol-
ogy. For example, since August 2007, the BTWC used the Imple-
mentation Support Unit (ISU), as a conduit to facilitate the flow
of information between science and security communities. This
played an important role in increasing awareness of the Conven-
tion and its provisions in policy, technical, and public forums.46
Taking advantage of its close ties with biologists, the ISU organizes,
co-organizes, and participates in major international conferences
and other activities in the life science research field to successfully
improve scientists’ awareness of the potential risks of abuse and
intentional injury, and promote scientists’ participation in the
implementation of responsible science behavior. However, the
effectiveness of the BTWC is currently restricted by the ‘‘mismatch
between the rapid progress of technological change and slower,
multilateral negotiations.”47 With biotechnology research and
application continuing to progress quickly and rapidly at a global
scale, it has become necessary to carry out international coordina-
tion of governance measures through or under the auspices of the
UN or other multilateral agencies.42 Therefore, to address the effec-
tive implementation of a code of conduct for biologists in the life
science research field, practicing them under the framework of
the BTWC seems a viable solution.
Although the BTWC is an agreement among states rather than
individuals, its functionality increasingly depends on the profes-
sional knowledge and judgment of individual scientists. This is par-
ticularly in the era of fast-progressing biotechnologies with
obvious beneficial and risky dual-use characteristics. Furthermore,
it is important for scientists who engage in the assessment of
biosecurity or biosecurity threats to understand which acts are
appropriate and which should be prohibited.48 Subsequently, sci-
entists are obligated to explain their assessments to decision mak-
ers and put forward constructive solutions. Reports from the
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) of the U.
S. and other organizations have found that codes of conduct can
effectively improve understanding of biosecurity risks. Moreover,
the process of formulating the code educates researchers49 thereby
promoting the key goals of the BTWC.6. Responsible life science research and respective
responsibilities under the code of conduct
Recently, the idea of formulating an international code of con-
duct has been raised multiple times in the review and expert meet-
ings of the BTWC, resulting in heated discussions on its usefulness
and implementation on an international, national, or institutional
scale.50 According to a working paper jointly submitted by the Chi-
nese and Pakistani governments at the latest Review Conference of
State Parties, biologists and all relevant personnel engaged in bio-
science research and related activities should abide by nine basic
principles during research and application of aforementioned
research: ethical standards; legal constraints; research integrity;
respect for experimental subjects, scientific research projects and
processes; constraints on dissemination of results; roles in popu-
larization of scientific research; institutional responsibility; and
roles in international exchange. The formulation of a code of con-
duct is only the first step towards self-management by biologists,
the challenge remains the promotion of the true adoption and
implementation of these codes. To overcome this challenge, the113responsible research that needs to be conducted and the main
stakeholders involved must be identified.
a. Professional researchers. These individuals, including
researchers, post doctorates, undergraduates, and postgraduates
who work in universities, private enterprises, non-profit organiza-
tions, and government research laboratories, are the most impor-
tant beneficiaries of the codes of conduct. According to the
InterAcademy partnership (IAP), ‘‘scientists are obliged not to do
any harm. Therefore, they should always bear in mind potential
consequences, and that their research may be harmful. They
should realize that the goodwill of individuals cannot completely
prevent the abuse of science.”51 Resnik and Shamoo argued that
the responsibilities of scientists should also include not conducting
or publishing research that is harmful or dangerous to others, not
sharing dangerous biological materials, maintaining the confiden-
tiality of research, reporting and informing the public of suspicious
activities, educating other researchers and students on bioterror-
ism, assisting in formulating policies related to bioterrorism, and
promoting research on response to bioterrorism.52 According to
the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scien-
tists by the Center for Biosafety Research and Strategy at Tianjin
University, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and the
Interacademy Partnership (IAP), which revised the previous work-
ing paper no. 30 ‘‘Code of Conduct for Biologists (Model)” jointly sub-
mitted by the governments of China and Pakistan at the 8th review
conference of the State Parties to the BTWC in 2016, professional
scientists or scientific institutions, including research, funding,
and regulatory bodies, have the following responsibilities.
i) To respect human life and relevant social ethics, responsibly
use biosciences for peaceful purposes that benefit human-
kind, promote a culture of responsible conduct in bio-
sciences, and guard against the misuse of science for
malicious purposes, including harm to the environment.
ii) To be aware of and observe applicable domestic laws and
regulations, international legal instruments, and norms
relating to biological research, including those on the prohi-
bition of biological weapons.
iii) To promote scientific integrity and prevent misconduct in
research, and be aware of the multiple applications of bio-
logical sciences, including their potential use for developing
biological weapons.
iv) To protect the welfare of both human and non-human
research participants and apply the highest ethical stan-
dards in research conduct, fully respecting research subjects.
v) To identify and manage potential risks in pursuit of benefits
of biological research and processes, while considering
potential biosecurity concerns at all stages of scientific
research. To put oversight mechanisms and operational rules
in place that prevent, mitigate, and respond to risks and
establish a culture of safety and security.
vi) To maintain a well-educated, fully trained scientific commu-
nity that is well versed in relevant laws, regulations, interna-
tional obligations, and norms. To provide education and
training that includes input from experts from multiple
fields, including social and human sciences, to provide a
more robust understanding of the implications of biological
research.
vii) To raise awareness on potential biosecurity risks that might
result from deliberate misuse of research. For scientists and
scientific journals to strike a balance, when disseminating
research findings, between maximizing benefits and mini-
mizing harm.
viii) To play an active role in encouraging public understanding
and interest in biological science and technology, including
its potential benefits and risks. Communicating scientific
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standings to maintain public trust. Advocating for peaceful
and ethical applications of biosciences and working collec-
tively to prevent the misuse of biological knowledge, tools,
and technologies.
ix) To identify the potential for misuse of bioscience research,
and ensuring that expertise, equipment, and facilities are
not used for illegal, harmful, or malicious purposes at any
stage of research. Establishing a training system for scien-
tists and appropriate mechanisms and processes to monitor,
assess, and mitigate potential vulnerabilities and risks in sci-
entific activities and dissemination.
x) To encourage international cooperation and collaboration in
the pursuit of peaceful innovation in, and applications of,
biosciences, and promoting learning and exchange opportu-
nities to share best practices in biosecurity. Furthermore, to
actively provide relevant expertise and assistance in
response to potential biosecurity threats.
b National Scientific Institutions. Scientific institutions consist
of scientists selected for outstanding research. They actively work
with regulators in their countries to formulate codes of conduct for
biologists and present independent expert aid to government reg-
ulatory decisions. In particular, fair judgments on policy decisions
in terms of science, must be free from the influence of political,
industrial, or other special interests. Scientific institutions commu-
nicate and share information with those of other countries and glo-
bal convention organizations, while condemning any academic
misconduct by domestic biologists in public on behalf of domestic
academia. The National Academy of Sciences, the most honorable
academic institution in each country, should organize regular
reviews of its research and provide guidance for responsible scien-
tific research. The Engineering and Medical Responsibility Commit-
tee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences issued Cultivating
Research Integrity guidelines in 2017, which contains reviews for
‘‘responsible research behavior” proposed by the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), and basic principles put forward for educa-
tional evaluation of responsible research.53
c. National-level Scientific Societies Scientific societies are
associations authorized by law, and their members are usually pro-
fessionals in relevant fields. The government typically grants self-
management to these societies, as long as their professional
knowledge is commensurate with public interests.26 Due to the
nature of these professional societies, they are in the best position
to understand the potential risks of relevant research. They are also
beneficial for forming codes of conduct for their members in speci-
fic sub-fields. National scientific societies in specific sub-fields
should take the initiative to introduce and explain biosecurity risks
from the field to government regulators and scientific academies.
They should participate in the formulation of domestic codes of
conduct for biologists, and provide their practical progress to pro-
fessional associations at the international level as policy reserves.
For example, the International Union of Microbiological Societies
(IUMS) adopted the Code of Ethics against Misuse of Scientific
Knowledge, Research Results and Resources in 2006, which is
based on the previous achievements of the American Society for
Microbiology (ASM) on the topic.54 In the case of any academic
misconduct, scientific societies representing the relevant field
should cooperate with national scientific academies in public
condemnation.
d. International scientific societies and academic organiza-
tions During research, scientists transcend national and political
boundaries to establish contacts and form organizations with col-
leagues from different countries based on common interests.54 This
process includes strengthening scientific undertaking, promoting
cooperation among scientists, and providing independent advice114on key global issues. For instance, the Global Partnership Working
Group and the International Union of Microbiological Societies
(IUMS) have been important advocates for self-awareness of biose-
curity risks among biologists and formulated codes of conduct for
their members. International scientific societies have significant
advantages in dealing with international agreements under the
global framework, as they can establish a transnational dialog,
which gathers scientists from academia and industry, scientific
and technical members of state party delegations, and security pol-
icy experts from different countries to promote consensus on cer-
tain issues.12 They should therefore also bear the responsibility of
publicly condemning any academic misconduct in biological
research.
e. Research Institutions Research institutions, including gov-
ernment research institutions, universities, non-profit research
institutions, and private enterprises with R&D capabilities, are
high-level organizations for biological research. Ideally, each insti-
tution should establish its own institutional biosafety55 and ethics
committees56 with the following mandates:
i) Formulate their codes of conduct;
ii) Represent all necessary professional knowledge in the field
(when the above conditions are not available internally, they
should be obtained externally);
iii) Have the right to make final review decisions;
iv) Obtain clear mandates, such as funds and time, to ensure the
implementation of review tasks;
v) Consist of scholars from related fields but remain indepen-
dent to eliminate potential conflicts of interest (external
experts can be selected).
In addition, research institutions should be responsible for
monitoring risks and conducting biosecurity risk assessments dur-
ing the conduction of research. For any unpredictable results dur-
ing research, or changes in understanding of the risks due to
developments in the field, reassessment should be organized
immediately. Moreover, research institutions should assume the
responsibility of providing education and training to ensure that
all researchers are fully aware of all potential risks and should ‘‘for-
mulate education and training programs by providing a guiding
framework to determine the roles and responsibilities of profes-
sional researchers in risk prevention and control, and evaluate
individual performance,”57 and improve researchers’ abilities to
prevent biosecurity risks through a combination of classes, practi-
cals, and field training under the guidance of tutors.58 Finally, to
ensure that researchers can truly understand and implement the
codes of conduct, institutions must ensure that their members rec-
ognize and accept the legal responsibilities and consequences of
violating the codes,59 and improve their own evaluation and pro-
motion systems. For example, the American Public Health Service
Act requires all research institutions that have received funding
from the U.S. federal government since 1985 to formulate internal
policies for scientific misconduct.10
f. Sponsors. Research funding typically comes not only from
government agencies but also from businesses and non-profit
organizations. Accordingly, sponsors can be classified as grant or
contract sponsors. As the major funding source, governments usu-
ally have the dual identities of grant and contract sponsors in life
science research. As a sponsor, the government should ensure that
all biological research projects funded have carried out sufficient
risk assessment and feasibility analysis on possible health and
social threats, and should help researchers and institutions formu-
late prevention, emergency, and education programs compatible
with risk management and control. For example, the largest fund-
ing agency for life sciences research, the NIH, requires instruction
in RCR as a condition of funding for all trainees, fellows, partici-
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businesses and non-governmental organizations may lack the
capability to assess all biosecurity risks, they should be responsible
for ensuring that researchers who receive the funding have the
ability to identify, assess, and manage potential biosecurity risks.
g. Regulators. Some scholars have proposed that ‘‘it is inevita-
ble that top-down government supervision will be required before
academia has reached a full consensus, that is, an effective match
between self-regulation and public opinion”.11 The current trend
in the governance of bioscience and technology risks is to establish
country-level biosecurity measures. Governance tools include soft
law and informal measures, such as professional standards, codes
of ethics, and education, as well as awareness measures.61 In addi-
tion, as specialized institutions are responsible for managing and car-
rying out biological research, regulatory authorities should promote
legislation at the national level to avoid temporary, ineffective, and
uncoordinated supervision.11 Regulators should also be responsible
for formulating and promulgating relevant regulatory rules. For
example, in 2008, Israel passed the Regulation of Research into Bio-
logical Disease Agents, establishing the Hazardous Biological Agents
Committee as a national regulator responsible for assessing the risks
posed by the proposed experiments to the health, welfare, and safety
of the Israeli. The regulator should assess all possible risks related to
biosecurity and ethics before the projects are approved.62 Regulators
should also serve as important participants in formulating domestic
codes of conduct. In addition to formulating and implementing hard
law measures, the U.S. government also plays an important role in
soft law.16 The formulation of soft laws requires regulators to actively
communicate and negotiate with academia and private businesses.
For example, when the biannual List of Selective Agents and Toxins
review was carried out in 2010, the U.S. government adopted a more
transparent approach, inviting academic scientists to participate in
the policy revision, including researchers and project leaders in the
review working group, and taking suggestions from the public.63
h. Scientific publishers and other disseminators. It is not
enough to rely solely on moral education to strengthen the respon-
sibility of biologists.64 As a platform for the publication of research
results, scientific publishers and other disseminators bear the
responsibility to restrict or prohibit the dissemination of research
that could be abused by state and non-state actors and threaten
public health. Publishers should ensure that the biosecurity risks
of the research results and processes are fully evaluated during
the peer review process, and that proper social dissemination of
scientific research is adopted to avoid misunderstandings among
the public. In 2003, the editors of several major scientific journals
issued a joint statement calling for a careful review and publication
of safety-sensitive research related to microbiology, infectious
agents, public health, and plant and agricultural systems.65 Other
platforms, such as online social media, which are increasingly
becoming an alternative form of research dissemination, should
be treated the same as traditional scientific publishers. Ultimately,
the responsibility for disseminating scientific achievements falls
on everyone who participates in knowledge transmission chains.667. Building a Multi-level system of ethical code for biologists
under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of
the United Nations with effective implementation
The recent global COVID-19 pandemic has had profound global
economic and social impacts. The upheavals have highlighted the
fact that we live in an interconnected world and that science
occurs in a societal context. We are more aware of the need to
improve biological security against natural, accidental, and delib-
erately caused disease, and the question of biological security has
therefore been pushed up the global governance agenda in a way115that is rarely possible. It is thus urgent to strengthen existing inter-
national biosecurity governance mechanisms to prevent the mali-
cious abuse of life science research and maintain international
biological arms control norms. Awareness is growing among state
parties that a code of conduct may be necessary, under the frame-
work of the BTWC, for professionals engaged in life science
research from the government, academia, and industry to
strengthen biosecurity education, awareness, and publicity.11 The
participation of the global life scientific community in the formula-
tion of a code of conduct for biologists under the framework of the
BTWC can help reduce the risks that may be incurred due to acci-
dental or intentional abuse of life science research. In the context
of global pandemics, the 9th Review Conference of the State Parties
to the BTWC in 2022 will be crucial for all state parties to reach a
consensus on a code of conduct and its effective implementation.
Although the code of conduct for biologists is voluntary, it is an
important supplement to the domestic laws and regulations in life
science research of all countries and the existing codes and guidelines
of international academic organizations. The industry security stan-
dards formulated by international organizations, such as the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO), have in fact become
international laws and regulations, and their contents have later been
transformed into domestic regulations in many countries.10 Here we
argue that to improve the culture of biosafety, biosecurity, and
responsible conduct, the life sciences will have to pay more attention
to lessons learned in other fields and adapt those tools and frame-
works.67 In the process of seeking effective implementation of these
codes, it is not enough to create only the responsibility framework to
produce a set of governance measures; systematic creation of an
implementation system of ethical codes at both international and
domestic levels is also necessary (Fig. 1).8. Effective approaches of development and implementation of
code of conduct at an international level
In accordance with Article XII of the BTWC, a review conference of
the state parties is held every five years to review its implementation
and discuss scientific and technological progress relevant to the
BTWC.68 Therefore, formulation of a code of conduct for biologists
under the framework of the BTWC requires all state parties to first
achieve a consensus on the purpose, principles, content, and imple-
mentation of the code at the annual Meetings of Experts (MX) and
Meetings of State Parties (MSP), and then reach a BTWC resolution.
a. The code should serve as an ideal (ethical code) for the prin-
ciples of integrity, honesty, and objectivity in biological research.
This will help raise awareness among biologists of the power of
biotechnology and the ethical responsibilities that arise from it.
Simultaneously, it establishes the ideals of scientific research
behavior and indicates behaviors that should be punished accord-
ing to the law.42 This ethical code constitutes a principal guidance
for state parties to establish their own domestic codes.
b. The code should draw lessons from past laws and regulations
on the biosecurity of state parties. It is worth noting that state par-
ties have been exploring the possibility of defining individual
engagement in activities that should be prohibited by the Conven-
tion as national criminal offenses since 2005,69 and some of the
widely accepted codes of conduct in the past have been used by
courts to establish legal standards.70 In particular, in 2021, as a
response to biosecurity and biosafety issues in China, the China
Biosafety Law (CBL) leaned towards using laws to regulate bioeth-
ical issues in this field.54 Therefore, a code of conduct will also pro-
vide a reference for state parties to formulate, revise, and update
their national laws and regulations for biosecurity.
c. The codes should take full account of all existing codes of
international academic organizations and professional societies.
Fig. 1. System for implementation of an ethical code of conduct for biologists.
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dealing with international conventions, as they provide an effec-
tive mechanism for scientists worldwide to participate.66 For
example, in 2015, state parties reached a resolution on the formu-
lation of the Hague Code of Ethics for Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion to promote a culture of responsible behavior in chemistry
research and prevent the misuse of chemical technology. As a prin-
cipal guide for global chemical research activities, the Hague Code
of Ethics has been recognized by the International Union of Pure
and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) and the International Council of
Chemical Associations (ICCA) and plays an important role in regu-
lating all responsible chemical research.
9. Effective approaches of development and implementation of
code of conduct at a domestic level
The formulation of an ethical code of conduct for biologists
within the framework of the BTWC would further reaffirm the
strong commitment of state parties to the objectives of the BTWC
and strengthen the efforts of all state parties in promoting biosecu-
rity education, awareness, and advocacy at the domestic level.71 To
fulfill goal, state parties must first formulate their national codes of
conduct (educational or advisory) based on this code, which will
provide specific guidelines for life science research in their own
countries. However, it is worth noting that codes of conduct alone
are not enough to reduce risks arising from biological research. In
some countries and organizations, such as the EU, policymakers
still do not consider self-regulation and norm construction as
viable alternatives to hard law.3 In fact, an integrated approach
including both soft and hard laws may be necessary in some
cases.72 In this context, dialogue, communication, and cooperation
between the governments as regulators and the audience of the
code of conduct is important, and an appropriate balance between
top-down legal regulation and bottom-up autonomy of the scien-
tific community must be reached.
10. Effective approaches of development and implementation
of code of conduct at a national level
National-level codes of conduct are often influenced by national
laws and policies. Hard and soft law are not mutually exclusive, but
rather mutually influential management measures for governing116biological research risks. Voluntary standards and codes of conduct
can often be made more effective through criminal law to punish
damage caused by accidental misuse or intentional abuse.73 In this
process, regulators, as the main developers of hard law and impor-
tant participants in the formulation of soft law, need to take advan-
tage of their organizational capability and adopt a more
transparent approach to open dialogue with all stakeholders. Dur-
ing this discourse, regulators, scientists, and other stakeholders
should openly discuss the potential risks of scientific research
and propose measures that reduce identified risks, including
responsible research by scientists and sound regulatory policies
by regulators.74 In addition, the public should be encouraged to
openly express their views.
These codes of conduct should be integrated with those of inter-
national academic organizations previously implemented. The
Statement on Biosecurity issued by the IAP in 2005 has a great
influence on national-level codes, and it could serve as a good ref-
erence for drafting guidelines for specific items. For example, the
Responsible Behavior of Global Research Institutions report pub-
lished by the InterAcademy Partnership Council in 2012 stated that
researchers should fully consider the potential harmful conse-
quences of their research when first planning a project.54 Referring
targeted and specific guidance from international academic organi-
zations will mean that more scientists can participate in the pro-
cess of formulating codes of conduct of their own countries, thus
enhancing their sense of ownership of the codes.75 Based on the
experience of international academic organizations in including
the scientific community, establishing a culture of responsible bio-
logical research, and defining standards of research regulation,
many countries have invited experts from international academic
organizations to share their experiences in formulating codes of
conduct. In 2008, the U.S. government invited international scien-
tific organizations such as the IAP to convene a workshop on incor-
porating biosecurity risk education into a training program for
biologists.76
National-level codes of conduct should also guide the establish-
ment of internal codes of conduct for individual research institu-
tions, domestic academic organizations, and sub-fields according
to their needs. Academic organizations are more likely to be
involved in promoting responsible scientific research by highlight-
ing the exemplary behaviors of scientific leaders within their own
organization and97 this requires the creation of specific educational
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biological research is conducted, ‘‘institutions with better-
developed biosecurity programs tend to be more likely to intro-
duce and implement an internal responsible biosafety culture,”77
i.e., to become ‘‘a Highly Reliable Organization (HRO) with a good
performance record. . .to ensure its members’ compliance through
supervision.”78 Therefore, the effectiveness of their codes of con-
duct is determined by the institutions’ ability to prevent and con-
trol risks, by adopting enforceable codes – that is, institutions
should clarify what are and are not acceptable research behaviors
in the specific content of the code.
As the subjects of the codes of conduct for scientific research,
biologists should first consciously comply with all legal rules and
standards on scientific research in their countries, and consciously
resist illegal acts such as deliberately neglecting and ignoring laws
and regulations and circumventing supervision.79 Since most bio-
logical research occurs within a biologist’s country, domestic level
codes act directly on them. According to the above elaboration,
national-level codes, internal codes of institutions, and codes of
academic organizations differ in design based on their different
purposes. Biologists are expected to accept the specific educational
guidelines and recommendations provided by national and domes-
tic academic organizations, and adhere to the enforceable codes
formulated by research institutions, which are responsible for reg-
ulating the entire research process.11. Conclusion
As the formulation and implementation of a code of conduct,
the fundamental guideline for life science research worldwide, is
influenced by the laws and policies of state parties, the experiences
of relevant international academic organizations should be uti-
lized. Ideally, for an ethical code of conduct for biologists, a resolu-
tion reached by all state parties of the BTWC should guide each
state party to develop their national codes based on their own
needs and circumstances. Moreover, it is recommended that
research institutions and academic organizations at all levels for-
mulate their own codes and implement the responsibilities of biol-
ogists based on this and their own national codes of conduct. The
effectiveness of the codes depends on how well they are imple-
mented by the scientific community,53 especially the distribution
of governance responsibilities, which could represent a huge chal-
lenge because each committee and organization will have its own
subculture and established norms and practices.10 Thus, further
research on how to effect self-discipline under the framework of
the BTWC at different levels, in terms of formulation of subjects
and procedures, and implementation of and compliance with rules,
needs to be conducted. The global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic
over the past 2 y, and the upcoming 9th Review Conference of the
BTWC in 2022 has increased the urgency for this and introduced a
rare historical window to advocate responsible life science
research at a global level. As the first step toward this goal, a con-
sensus resolution among the state parties will be valuable in rais-
ing awareness and participation levels of the scientific community
and making effective and collective efforts to build a global code of
conduct for biologists.Conflict of interest
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